Abstract
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has a significant programmatic interest in the safe and secure routing and transportation of Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) and High Level Waste (HLW) in the United States, including shipments entering the country from locations outside U.S borders. In any shipment of SNF/HLW, there are multiple “chains;” a jurisdictional chain as the material moves between jurisdictions (state, federal, tribal, administrative), a physical supply chain (which mode), as well as a custody chain (which stakeholder is in charge/possession) of the materials being transported. Given these interconnected networks, there lies vulnerabilities, whether in lack of communication between interested stakeholders or physical vulnerabilities such as interdiction. By identifying key links and nodes as well as administrative weaknesses, decisions can be made to “harden” the physical network and improve communication between stakeholders. This paper examines the parallel chains of oversight and custody as well as the chain of stakeholder interests for the shipments of SNF/HLW and the potential impacts on systemic resiliency. Using the Crystal River shutdown location as well as a hypothetical international shipment brought into the United States, this paper illustrates the parallel chains and maps them out visually.
