Abstract
Abstract—We consider an infrastructure consisting of a network of systems each composed of discrete components that can be reinforced at a certain cost to guard against attacks. The network provides the vital connectivity between systems, and hence plays a critical, asymmetric role in the infrastructure operations. We characterize the system-level correlations using the aggregate failure correlation function that specifies the infrastructure failure probability given the failure of an individual system or network. The survival probabilities of systems and network satisfy first-order differential conditions that capture the component-level correlations. We formulate the problem of ensuring the infrastructure survival as a game between an
attacker and a provider, using the sum-form and product-form utility functions, each composed of a survival probability term and a cost term. We derive Nash Equilibrium conditions which provide expressions for individual system survival probabilities, and also the expected capacity specified by the total number of operational components. These expressions differ only in a single term for the sum-form and product-form utilities, despite their significant differences.We apply these results to simplified models of distributed cloud computing infrastructures.
