Abstract
Security costs for nuclear reactors have been shown to rise over the lifecycle of a nuclear facility as new threats, security weaknesses, and the generic threat profile of the plant location change over time. This paper conducts a review of the technological gaps that currently exist in Security by Design (SeBD) based on the literature available and attempts to close those gaps through proposing technological constructs and processes that can integrate safety and security in the design process of a plant, with a primary focus on SMR technology. Under the new modular and mass manufacturing regime, where plant designs attempt to reduce costs with potential economies of scale and modular construction, the current SeBD definitions focusing on state level regulators are not considered adequate since the licensing stage is often too late in the design process to integrate the true cost savings of SeBD. Thus, this paper attempts to remedy the current logic in order to allow for continuous implementation of security alongside the development of the safety concept for the plant. If adopted within the design process the establishment of this type of technology will allow for a technological ecosystem to evolve that will imbed security concepts into the physical design of the components of the plant.
